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NOTES
TWO DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
ON THE RESTRAINT OF COMMUNISTIC ACTIVITY
By
PERLIE P. FALLON*
During the term that ended in June the Supreme Court of the United States
reviewed the legality of restraints on Communistic activity. The several cases
that the court considered are grouped under two titles: Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, Attorney General of the United States,' and Dennis v.
United States.2 The group of cases first named concerned the action of the Attorney
General in designating to the Loyalty Review Board, the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee, The National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. and Inter-
national Workers' Order, Inc. as subversive organizations. In the second named
case the court reviewed the conviction in the Southern District of New York of
11 persons for the violation of the Smith Act by activities in the organization of
the Communit Party of the United States.
Here I shall state in simple language the background of these cases; and I
shall explain in popular terms points of law that the justices considered in their
opinions.
In the first named group of cases the Attorney General of the United States
certified to the Loyalty Review Board that the organizations named were Com-
munist.
The President's order of March 21, 1947 that fixed the responsibility of the
Civil Service Commission directed the Attorney General to furnish the Loyalty
Review Board with the name of each group that the Attorney General after proper
investigation should designate as Communist, Fascist, totalitarian or subversive oi
engaged upon a policy of committing acts of violence for the purpose of denying
others their rights under the Constitution or seeking to alter the form of the Gov-
ernment by unconstitutional means.
The executive order directed the Loyalty Review Board to communicate this
information to all the departments and agencies of the Government.
The three organizations which were plaintiffs in the suit first named sued for
the purpose of having the court direct that their names be deleted from the list.
The Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee stated in its petition that it was a charit-
able organization engaged in relief work. The National Council of American-
Soviet Friendship, Inc. stated in its petition that it engaged in the purpose ot
strengthening friendly relations between the United States and Russia, and that
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it sought to further the interests of the American People by constitutional means,
and that it never in any way engaged in Communistic activity. The International
Workers' Order, Inc. stated in its petition that it was engaged as a fraternal benefit
society under the insurance law of New York.
When the petitions were presented in the courts of original jurisdiction,
the Attorney General of the United States moved that the complaints be dis-
missed as insufficient in law. The various courts dismissed the petitions. The At-
torney General's motion raised questions of law alone; there was no trial of the
matters of fact that the petitions contained. The Attorney General said through
his motion that the court did not have the power to review the President's action
in respect to the appointment of employees of the Government, and that the organ-
izations that were named had no interest in the matter since they were not affected
by the action.
Law, like every other traditional practice, has processes that become fixed
over periods of time. There is a way of doing things. The law accepts such forms of
practice in order to use an orderly procedure. Among the procedural rules it has
long been recognized that when a party denies the sufficiency of a pleading as a
matter of law, the court must accept all of the statements that are in the pleading
as true for the instant purpose of determining the motion. Under this rule the At-
torney General's motion admitted for the purposes of the motion the facts stated
in the petitions. The petition of one of the organizations said that it was a charitable
organization engaged in relief work. The petition of another stated that it was
engaged in fraternal benefit insurance. The petition of the third went further
and denied that it sought to act other than by Constitutional means. The admission
of these claims for the purposes of the motion related back to the Attorney General's
designation of the organizations as subversive. The Attorney General did not in-
tend by the motion to admit that any of the statements in the petitions were true as
ultimate facts. The motion, that was made for the purpose of raising a point of
law, had the legal effect, however, of admitting the truth of the facts stated for
the immediate purpose.
If the facts contained in the petition were true, then the act of designating
the organizations as subversive was arbitrary. The designation then stood as con-
trary to the record in the case before the court.
Since the designation interfered with the legal right of the organizations to
carry on their work, a case was before the court that it might consider.
Two Justices of the Supreme Court placed their decision in reversing the lower
court and in sending the matter back for a full trial upon the ground of the
admission of the facts stated in the petitions. These Justices did not thereby make
a finding as to the facts.
The President's order was like a two-edged sword in that it brought public
attention to the organizations and at the same time became evidence upon which
the Loyalty Review Board might act in the removal of a Government employee.
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The Loyalty Review Board could not go behind the Attorney General's d'esignation
of an organization as subversive. The Attorney General's designation made after
inquiry but without a hearing and directed against an organization might become
evidence against an individual in a proceeding affecting his property right in his
position. Since the designation might become evidence and be used as such and th-e
designation had not been reached after a hearing, four Justices, including one of
the Justices who accepted the motion as an admission, thought it necessary to go
beyond the point respecting the Attorney General's admission through his motion
to dismiss the petitions and consider a point that rests in the Bill of Rights which
lawyers describe as "due process." That which proceeds in the traditional way is
due process of law. The basic step in the legal process is a hearing. The four Justices
who were of the opinion that the order was invalid in itself, since the Attorney
General had not reached the result after a hearing, were looking at the traditional
procedures of the law. The designation these Justice thought to b-e a denial of due
process of law. They impliedly treated the organizations as having legal standing
to raise the point and as being injured by the action. The Attorney General's action
directed at the organizations carried over to the individuals.
One Justice went further than the due process point, that point resting on
the lack of a hearing, and treated the Attorney General's designation as a form
of censorship inconsistent with the provisions of the First Amendment that guar-
antees freedom of speech. He drew an analogy with the bill of attainder. In the
early English Law a bill of attainder was an act of a legislative body pronouncing
a sentence of death against an accused person and causing the extinction of all
the accused's civil rights.
Three Justices were of tht opinion that the petitions should be dismissed and
that the Attorney General's motion should be granted. These Justices treated the
statements in the petitions as assumptions of law and not of facts; thereby, the
Attorney General had made no admission. The First Amendment does not create
a freedom so wide that it embraces a privilege of overturning law and order. The
designation did not deprive the organizations of a right nor subject them to a
punishment. If they were permitted to enter the investigation they were permitted
thereby to interfere with the executive control of Federal employees. The designation
was not conclusive in respect to employees. The removal of Federal employees for
disloyalty is made after notice; the designation became only a part of the evidence.
The employees had a chance to explain. Thus these three dissenting Justices met
the points that the five justices, voting to deny the motion to dismiss, had made.
The problems of law that I have analyzed arose out of the nature of the exe-
cutive order. The order was directed to a dual purpose. On the one hand the order
engaged in the very proper purpose of combatting subversive organizations through
publicity. The Attorney General as the law 'enforcement officer of the Federal
Government was a proper agent for that function. The further purpose of the order
was the control of Federal employees. Each of the purposes was proper. The joining
DICKINSON LAW REVIEWV
of the two purposes in a single order, however, confused the order. The order in
discharging its publicity purpose carried a conclusive presumption into the field of
property right, namely, Federal employment.
The executive control of Federal employees is a field of discretion always,
and most especially, in matters that concern the national safety. The free exercise
of, the effective discharge of and the executive control over Federal employment
hardly required the order. The English system of control over public employment
apparently rests in executive discretion. So here the publicity that was an effective
sanction for the first purpose of the order, the spotlighting of subversive action,
became a hindrance in the execution of the second purpose, the prevention of
disloyalty in the Federal service.
The case of Dennis v. United States8 arose from the conviction of the eleven
defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York for conspiring to violate the Smith Act.
Sec. 2(a) sub. s'ec. (3) of the Smith Act makes it unlawful for any one to
engage in organizing any society or group which teaches or advocates the over-
throw of any government in the United States by force or violence; and Sec. 2 (a)
sub. sec. (3) also makes it unlawful for a person to affiliate with such a group
knowing its purpose. Sec. 3 of the Act makes it unlawful for persons to conspire to
commit any of the acts that Sec. 2 forbids.
The indictment charged that the defendants had conspired to organize the
Communist Party of the United States of America, a group that teaches and ad-
vocates the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence,
and had conspired also to teach the duty of overthrowing that government by force
and violence.
The Supreme Court had accepted the case for limited review only and to
determine if the Smith Act invaded the right of free speech as defined in the First
Amendment, and to determine whether the Smith Act was invalid in failing to fix
definite standards of action.
The Court in a limited review accepts without further enquiry the facts that the
lower court has found to be true. If we take the trial court's charge to the jury and the
jury's verdict we would infer that the defendants were found guilty of conspiring
to organize a group of persons to teach and advocate the duty of overthrowing the
Federal government by force and violence, and of conspiring to advocate and teach
the overthrow of that government by force and violence as a rule of action and by
language designed to incite to action.
A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons manifesting itselt
by words or acts whereby they agree to commit an unlawful act. The effective action
rests in the future. The futuristic nature of the action in the Dennis case created




the Court considered in the case will perhaps not be clear unless I first bring out iai
the most definite way possible that the charge against the defendants concerned
a plot to do an act at a later time. The indictment rested in part, if not in essence, on
a conspiracy to organize the Communist Party in this Country for the purpose
of overthrowing the Federal government. The means to attain this end was that
of organizing people to teach the Marxian theories as modified by Lenin and
Stalin. The plot was not to overthrow the government now; it was directed to the
forming of a party and the teaching of doctrines that were designed to have
that effect at some future time.
All of the Justices assumed that the statute limited the freedom of speech and
that the point of law before the Court was where the line between permissible
and non-permissible speech should be drawn.
Four Justices, after construing the statute as a protection of the "existing
government, not from change by peaceable, lawful and constitutional means, but
from change by violence, revolution and terrorism" held that free speech is not
an absolute right beyond legislative control and the overthrow of the government by
force and violence was a substantial interest that justified the Congress in limiting
speech. This power extended to attempts to overthrow the government. Neither
the success nor the probability of success is the test. The existence of the conspiracy
created the danger. The definition of the statute on which this reasoning rested
removed from the coverage of the statute all peaceful forms of discussion.
The trial judge haa charged the jury that the defendants must have done
the acts that the indictment alleged "all with the intent to cause the overthrow or
destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence as speed-
ily as circumstances would "permit." He also charged: "that there is sufficient
danger of a substantive evil that the Congress has a right to prevent to justify
the application of the statute under the First Amendment of the Constitution."
The four Justices held that the trial judge had acted properly in treating
thL existence of the danger as a matter of law and had acted properly in refusing
to allow the jury to determine that matter as a question of fact. They reasoned
that the point depended on a judicial construction of the First Amendment and the
existence of the 'evil was therefore a question of law for the court to determine.
These four Justices also were of the opinion that the statute as it had been
written was sufficiently definite in fixing standards of conduct; that the statute
fixed standards whereby all might know what could and could not be done legally.
The statute drew a line that its language clearly indicated.
One Justice was of the opinion that there is an inherent power in the Govern-
ment to preserve itself; and to the end Congress might restrict freedom of speech.
The immunities of the Bill of Rights are subject to exceptions. It is necessary ,o
weigh the conflicting interests. The responsibility in the first instance for ad-
justing the competing interests rests with Congress. The point for the court to con-
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sider is whether the statute leaves room for those safeguards that prevent con-
centrations of power. Congress was justified in finding that the conspiracy shown
on the record was a substantial threat to the national order and security. The re-
cruitment of additional members might well create a substantial danger to the
national security. In summary, this Justice was of the opinion that the competing
interests of freedom of speech and national security were a proper field for legis-
lative action and that the action of Congress was justified for the circumstances.
One Justice was of the opinion that a conspiracy in itself is a crime; and it
was not necessary to go further than that. A "present danger" test would permit
a period of preparation. Congress, since it could reach the act, could also reach
the attempt. Conspiracy being the test, no overt act was necessary. Congress has a
power to repress force and violence and so i. could punish the teaching or ad-
vocacy of it. This Justice sketched out the distinction between anarchistic terrorism
and the later forms of revolutionary activity.
One Justice was of the opinion that the defendants had been charged merely
with an agreement to assemble and to talk and to publish ideas at a later date. He
construed the statute as it had been applied in this case as a form of prior censorship
of speech and of the press that violated the First Amendment. He was of the opin-
ion also that the decision of the majority eliminated the "clear and present danger"
test that drew a line distinguishing between permissible and non-permissible con-
duct under the First Amendment.
One Justice was of the opinion that there was no evidence in the record of the
teaching of force and violence. The evidence showed a conspiracy to form a party
rather than a conspiracy to overthrow the Government. The books that the defend-
ants had used had not been outlawed. So here speech had become seditious con-
duct. In order to suppress speech under the First Amendment, there must be some
serious injury likely if the speech is allowed. The "clear and present danger" test
should haste been used; the trial judge should have submitted the existence of such
a danger to the jury as a question of fact. Evidence should be in the record upon
this issue. If the court were to take judicial notice of the development in political
affairs it would readily see that there is no "clear and present danger."
In this case the conspiracy section of the statute was used to bar attempts to
spread Communism. The statute defined the spreading of Communism as the
teaching or advocating the overthrow of the Federal government by force and vio-
lence at such time as it might be possible to attain that result. The case is concerned
essentially with attempts. The "clear and present danger" test has no application to
attempts if they be treated as crimes. Once attempts had been made illegal by the
definition set out in the statute the sole issue in the case was whether there had been
an attempt.
The court did not review the conduct of the trial; the court had denied the
petition for a writ of certiorari on that point.
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